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Abstract 
Intersubjectivity refers to the variety of possible relations between  perspectives. It is 
indispensable for understanding human social behaviour. While theoretical work on 
intersubjectivity is relatively sophisticated, methodological approaches to studying 
intersubjectivity lag behind. Most methodologies assume that individuals are the unit 
of analysis. In order to research intersubjectivity, however, methodologies are needed 
that take relationships as the unit of analysis. The first aim of this article is to review 
existing methodologies for studying intersubjectivity. Four methodological 
approaches are reviewed: comparative self-report, observing behaviour, analysing talk 
and ethnographic engagement. The second aim of the article is to introduce and 
contribute to the development of a dialogical method of analysis. The dialogical 
approach enables the study of intersubjectivity at different levels, as both implicit and 
explicit, and both within and between individuals and groups. The article concludes 
with suggestions for using the proposed method for researching intersubjectivity both 
within individuals and between individuals and groups.  
 
Key words: intersubjectivity, dialogical analysis, questionnaires, observation, 
methodology, self-report. 
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Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis 
The concept of intersubjectivity is used widely, but with varying meanings. 
Broadly speaking, we take intersubjectivity to refer to the variety of possible relations 
between people’s perspectives. If we take social life to be founded on interactions 
then intersubjectivity should be a core concept for the social sciences in general and 
understanding social behaviour in particular. Perhaps because of this broad relevancy 
research has been fragmented and at least six definitions are in circulation. Most 
simplistically, intersubjectivity has been used to refer to agreement in the sense of 
having a shared definition of an object (e.g., Mori & Hayashi, 2006). Going beyond 
simple sharing, it has been defined in terms of the mutual awareness of agreement or 
disagreement and even the realisation of such understanding or misunderstanding 
(e.g., Laing, Phillipson & Lee, 1966). Cognitive approaches have used the term to 
refer to the attribution of intentionality, feelings and beliefs to others (Gärdenfors, 
2008). Yet other approaches emphasise the embodied nature of intersubjectivity, 
conceptualising intersubjectivity as implicit and often automatic behavioural 
orientations towards others (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003). The 
situated, interactional and performative nature of intersubjectivity is emphasised by 
researchers such as Goffman (1959), Garfinkel (1984) and Schegloff (1992). And 
finally, cultural and dialogical researchers have used the term to study the partially 
shared and largely taken-for-granted background which interlocutors assume and 
against which things can be said and done (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Rommetveit, 1979; 
Schutz, 1973). While some of these definitions may be incomplete accounts of 
intersubjectivity (e.g., see Marková (2003a) and Matusov (1996) for critiques of 
intersubjectivity as agreement), we suggest that they are not mutually exclusive and 
that each captures a different and important aspect of the phenomenon. Accordingly, 
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we adopt an inclusive definition. We conceptualise intersubjectivity as the variety of 
relations between perspectives. Those perspectives can belong to individuals, groups, 
or traditions and discourses, and they can manifest as both implicit (or taken for 
granted) and explicit (or reflected upon).  
This article has two aims. First, it presents a review of existing methodologies 
for studying intersubjectivity. Second, it advances the dialogical method of analysis 
for the study of intersubjectivity. We begin by outlining how central intersubjectivity 
is to social science, and yet how little methodological attention the topic has received. 
The main body of the article is a review of four methodological approaches to the 
study of intersubjectivity: comparative self-report, observing behaviour, analysing 
talk and ethnographic engagement. Considering the benefits and limitations of these 
approaches leads us to conclude with suggestions for a dialogical analysis of 
intersubjectivity.  
Intersubjectivity and Social Life 
Intersubjectivity is central to the social life of humans. Thus, unsurprisingly, 
research pertaining, either directly or indirectly, to intersubjectivity spans many 
research areas of psychology. In developmental psychology it lies just below the 
surface of widely used concepts such as decentration (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), 
theory of mind (Doherty, 2008) and perspective taking (Martin, Sokol and Elfers, 
2008). In neuroscience, intersubjectivity has recently become a popular topic with the 
discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ which are thought to provide a neurological basis for 
imitation, theory of mind, language, and social emotions (Hurley & Chater, 2005). In 
the field of comparative psychology, there has been a surge of interest in 
intersubjectivity, in the form of investigations of possible perspective-taking amongst, 
for example, monkeys (Tomasello, Call and Hare, 2003) and scrub jays (Emery & 
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Clayton, 2001). Intersubjectivity, going by various names, is also central to research 
on communication. Phenomena such as addressivity, double voiced discourse, and 
dialogue are deeply intersubjective (Linell, 2009). Intersubjectivity has also been 
identified as important in small group research because it has been found that mutual 
understanding within small groups creates increased efficiency, reliability and 
flexibility (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Research on self and identity has long 
emphasised the importance of Self’s perceptions of Other’s perceptions of Self 
(James, 1890; Howarth, 2002). In the field of counselling, much therapeutic effort is 
directed at resolving misunderstandings and feelings of being misunderstood both of 
which indicate dysfunctional intersubjective relations (Cooper, 2009). 
Looking to the broader social sciences, the phenomenon of intersubjectivity is 
omnipresent. One can find it in Rousseau’s concept of the social contract, Durkheim’s 
thinking about society and solidarity, and Adam Smith’s analysis of economic 
exchange. Indeed in any exchange, whether economic, contractual, or political, each 
party needs to orient to the orientation of the other (Latsis, 2006). Inter-institutional 
partnerships, which are widespread, depend upon intersubjectivity. For example the 
funding of non-governmental organisations by international funding agencies 
(Cornish & Ghosh, 2007) and the inter-institutional relations that occur between 
different branches of the health service call for mutual orientation between 
representatives of institutions with very different histories, constraints, interests and 
thus perspectives (Engeström, Engeström and Vähäaho, 1999). Issues of 
intersubjectivity arise not only across, but also, within institutions. Large 
multinational corporations require their various departments to develop their own 
perspectives on the one hand, and to be aware of the perspectives of other 
departments on the other (Boland & Tenkasi, 1999). Today, all organizations need to 
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orient to the public. Public relations, marketing and advertising are the means by 
which organizations attempt to orient to the orientation of the public (Spekman, 
Salmond and Lambe, 1997). Finally, in cases where there is inter-group or even inter-
national conflict, questions of intersubjectivity are also central. Issues of identity are 
often at stake, and especially the struggle for recognition (Honneth, 1996). In the 
extreme cases of nuclear stand-off, and a politics of brinkmanship, again one finds 
that perspective-taking and misunderstanding are central (Booth & Wheeler, 2008).  
The above list is far from exhaustive. But the point is clear: across the social 
sciences, intersubjectivity is fundamental. Yet research on intersubjectivity remains 
relatively fragmented with each area developing its own methodological approach, 
with little cross cutting discussion about methodology.  
Methodological Obstacles 
The absence of a sustained and interdisciplinary discussion regarding 
appropriate methodologies for studying intersubjectivity is due, we argue, to an 
individualistic bias within contemporary methodology which has been widely 
documented (Farr, 1998). Even in research on intersubjectivity, the unit of analysis is 
often the individual (O’Donnell, Tharp and Wilson, 1993). Individuals are observed, 
interviewed, questioned, surveyed, scanned, and tested. Behavioural responses, 
attitudes, personality measurements, cognitive scores, social circumstances, opinions, 
habits, affiliations and preferences – all qualities attributed to individuals – are the 
kinds of phenomena which are considered as viable data. When individualistic 
assumptions are made, the relations between people or groups, whether intra-
psychological or inter-psychological, often become invisible.  
The separation between psychology and sociology has also stunted research on 
intersubjectivity. Since the discipline-founding work of James, Wundt and Durkheim 
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different so-called ‘levels’ have been institutionalized to the point of being taken-for-
granted (Doise, 1980). Although this carving out of different levels enabled both 
psychology and sociology to get on with studying individuals and social facts 
respectively, it left little room for intersubjectivity. The problem is that the 
phenomenon of intersubjectivity cuts across the boundary between psychology and 
sociology. Moreover, psychologists and sociologists who have strayed into the space 
between these so-called levels have often been criticised by their respective 
communities with all the motivation that an ontological threat to a discipline 
mobilises (Farr, 1996).  
Despite these prevailing obstacles, a handful of methodological approaches to 
the study of intersubjectivity have been developed, each of which makes visible a 
specific aspect of intersubjectivity. The following sections review the four major 
methodological approaches: comparative self-report, observing behaviour, analysing 
talk and ethnographic engagement. It is important to emphasise that the following 
review does not concern traditions of research, rather the focus is on methodological 
approaches. Accordingly, each methodological approach tends to be represented by 
several research traditions, and most of the major research traditions are represented 
by more than one methodology.  
Comparative Self-Report 
A common methodology for studying intersubjectivity is comparative self-
report questionnaires. This approach was developed to examine the extent to which 
people are able to accurately take the perspectives of each other. This line of research 
grew out of attempts to test the Meadian (1934) and symbolic interactionist (Blumer, 
1969) assumption regarding the importance of perspective-taking, or role-taking.  
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An early example of this approach is provided by Stryker (1956). He read 
Mead as postulating that groups which share a ‘universe of discourse’ will be better 
able to take each other’s perspectives. Accordingly Stryker deduced that there should 
be more accurate perspective-taking between parents and their children than between 
parents and in-laws; that persons of the same sex should be better at taking each 
other’s perspectives than persons of opposite sex; that persons of similar occupations 
should be better at taking each other’s perspectives and so on. Stryker’s 
methodological innovation was to adapt an attitude questionnaire for parenting style 
such that parents, offspring and in-laws provided self-reports both for themselves and 
for others. This enabled Stryker to compare, for example, the actual attitudes of 
parents with the attitudes ascribed to those parents by their children and their in-laws, 
and thus to assess the accuracy of the children’s and in-laws’ perspective-taking.  
Stryker’s comparative self-report methodology was adapted and used to 
address the question of whether Self’s self-perception corresponds to how Self is seen 
by Other (Cast, Stets and Burke, 1999; Shrauger & Schoenman, 1979). Again the 
theoretical impetus for this research was symbolic interactionism and the idea that 
one’s self-image emerges through seeing oneself as one is seen by Other. In this line 
of research self-report questionnaires are used to examine what Self thinks about Self, 
what Self thinks Other thinks about Self, and what Other actually thinks about self.  
Our concern is not with the results of the research, but with the methodology 
used. The basic principle is to compare what person A indicates on a questionnaire 
with what Person B thinks person A will indicate on the questionnaire. This enables 
measurement of the degree of convergence or divergence of perspective between 
Person A and B on the given topic. Although most of this research uses 
questionnaires, Q-sort methodologies have also been used (Funder, 1980). One could 
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also imagine a more inductive methodology where all participants would be asked to 
write a description of the other person’s attitudes, and then the other person or group 
would rate that description for accuracy. 
Arguably, the most sophisticated self-report questionnaire methodology was 
developed by Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966). Their starting point is theoretically 
informed, and quite similar to the framework proposed by Ichheiser (1943). Drawing 
upon the work of Sartre, Buber, Mead and Heider they suggest that there are three 
levels of intersubjectivity (Table 1). The first level is called the level of ‘direct 
perspectives’, and concerns both Self’s (S) and Other’s (O) perspectives on a given 
phenomenon (X). This is the level of attitude, opinion and direct representation. The 
second level is termed ‘meta-perspectives’ and pertains to Self’s and Other’s ideas 
about each others’ perspectives on the given phenomenon. The third level is called 
‘meta-metaperspectives,’ which refers to Self’s perspective on Other’s perspective on 
Self’s perspective on the object (and vice versa). The epistemological assumption 
made by Laing, Phillipson and Lee is that these three levels are open to analysis 
through self-report questionnaires. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The major contribution of Laing, Phillipson and Lee’s framework is that it 
provides a clear articulation of various possible intersubjective relations between 
people or groups (Table 2). By comparing the direct perspectives of two people or 
groups, researchers can identify agreement and disagreement. For example, John 
might hold the opinion that children should be given complete freedom when growing 
up. If Mary holds the same opinion, then both John and Mary can be said to agree on 
this point. By comparing a direct perspective with a metaperspective, cases of 
understanding and misunderstanding can be identified. For example, Mary might 
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mistakenly think that John thinks that children have too much freedom today. Finally, 
by comparing meta-metaperspectives with metaperspectives, researchers can examine 
whether people realize that there is understanding or misunderstanding. This complex 
level of analysis is necessary, Laing, Phillipson and Lee argue, because it is used in 
correcting misunderstandings. For example, in the case of the misunderstanding 
between John and Mary, one possible solution is for John to realise that Mary thinks 
that he thinks that children are too free.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Although Laing, Phillipson and Lee developed their framework in the context 
of family therapy, it is not limited to that context. For example, they argue that the 
distrust between East and West during the Cold War could be analysed in terms of 
these three levels. Not only did East and West fear each other (direct perspectives), 
but they were each aware that the other feared them (metaperspectives), and they each 
knew that the other was aware that they knew the other feared them (meta-
metaperspectives). Identifying these layers of intersubjective understanding and 
misunderstanding enables us to explain the actions of both sides. Because each side 
feared the other, they tried to protect themselves by amassing nuclear weapons. And 
because each side knew that the other side feared them, each side engaged in 
brinkmanship (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). But, because each side knew that the other 
side knew that they were fearful, each side was unable to be seen to capitulate to any 
bullying because such a capitulation would demonstrate their fear (Gillespie, 2007).  
So far we have used Laing, Phillipson and Lee’s framework to consider the 
actual relations between perspectives. However, the framework can also be used to 
examine perceived convergences and divergences of perspective (Table 3).Thus, for 
example, we can distinguish actual agreement (SX = OX) from perceived 
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agreement (SX = SOX), and we can distinguish actual understanding (SX = 
OSX) from feeling understood (SX = SOSX) and from perceived 
understanding (SOX = SOSX). Although Laing, Phillipson and Lee did 
not give much attention to these intrapsychological comparisons, their framework 
nonetheless provides a convenient means of conceptualising them.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
To operationalise their framework, Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966) 
developed the Interpersonal Perception Method questionnaire (IPM) which entails 
self-report questions to both parties regarding their direct, meta and meta-meta 
perspectives. Originally used in therapeutic contexts for diagnosing family 
misunderstandings, the IPM has since been adapted to study divergences of 
perspective in the health service (Assa-Eley & Kimberlin, 2005), family relations 
(Sillars, Koerner and Fitzpatrick, 2005), institutional coordination (Scheff, 1967), 
trust (Gillespie, 2007) and advertising (Gilbert, 1986). Refined statistical methods 
have also been developed for comparing perspectives (Kenny, 1994). Even a Boolean 
calculus has been developed in order to deal with the range of possible comparisons 
that the IPM affords (Alperson, 1975). Despite such appeal and applicability, 
however, the IPM framework cannot be declared a complete success. 
Reviewing the empirical literature on the IPM reveals that the third level, the 
level of meta-metaperspectives, proves deeply problematic. Meta-metaperspectives 
are either conspicuously absent (i.e., Assa-Eley & Kimberlin, 2005; Kenny, 1994; 
Scheff, 1967) or they produce unclear results (i.e., Allen & Thompson, 1984). The 
problem, we suspect, is that meta-metaperspectives cannot be adequately investigated 
using self report. Consider the first item from the IPM (Laing, Phillipson and Lee, 
1966, p. 182), which concerns understanding within a family relationship. It has three 
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parts. First there is a question about direct perspectives: “How true do you think the 
following are? – She understands me”. Then there is a question about 
metaperspectives: “How would she answer the following? – “I understand him”. Both 
of these questions have face validity. However, the same cannot be said for the third 
question which concerns meta-metaperspectives: “How would she think you have 
answered the following? – she understands me”. While the question is grammatically 
and logically correct, it is so complicated that it is difficult to answer meaningfully. 
This question requires the respondent to keep too many inter-related perspectives in 
mind at once. The problem with the refined statistical methods and Boolean calculus 
which have been developed is that while it may be logically easy to specify endless 
recursive perspective taking relations, these relations may not be open to self-report. 
This does not mean, however, that meta-metaperspectives are not real, and not 
worth researching. Everyday life is replete with examples of meta-metaperspecitves. 
For instance, an employee worries, after making a suggestion about how to better 
organise the workplace: ‘perhaps my manager thinks I disrespect her’. This is a meta-
metaperspective. It expresses the employee’s perspective on her manager’s 
perspective on the employee’s attitude towards the manager. Or a committee 
allocating funding might think ‘Unfortunately, many applicants seem to have 
misunderstood our intentions with this call, we need to make our intent clearer in the 
next round.’ Ostensibly simple statements such as ‘you always think I am trying to 
deceive you’ or ‘you are trying to make me feel guilty’ are recognisably part of 
everyday discourse, and they are at the level of meta-metaperspectives.  
Accordingly, it is not that meta-metaperspectives do not exist or are 
insignificant, but rather that the self-report methodology is not a suitable methodology 
for investigating them. Just as competent language users may not be able to be 
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explicit about their grammar or the pragmatics of speaking, so perspective-takers may 
make use of meta-metaperspectives, but find it difficult to verbalise them. To ask 
people to express their meta-metaperspectives in this way is to commit the 
‘psychologist’s fallacy’ (James, 1890), that is, to confuse the construct that is in the 
psychologist’s mind with the phenomenological experience in the research 
participant’s mind. We suggest that the third level of meta-metaperspectives is a 
useful construct for researchers, but that it rarely exists as a concept in the minds of 
participants. 
Nonetheless, using self-report questionnaires to study the inter-relations 
between direct and meta perspectives has been useful. In particular such 
questionnaires have a valuable diagnostic function, enabling researchers to quickly 
identify divergences of perspective within particular relationships or between large 
groups. The problem is that comparative self-report methods are limited to dealing 
with the fairly simple and explicit aspects of intersubjectivity.  
Observing Behaviour 
In contrast to the cognitive approach to intersubjectivity, assumed by those using self-
report questionnaires, other scholars have assumed that intersubjectivity is more 
behavioural and embodied. This conceptualisation goes back to Adam Smith 
(1759/2002), Mead (1934),  and Merleau-Ponty (1945) who emphasised the embodied 
and non-reflective nature of intersubjectivity. From this point of view, studying 
intersubjectivity with self-report questionnaires is akin to studying how people walk a 
tightrope or ride a bike using self-report questionnaires.  
One early pioneering study starting out with an embodied conception of 
intersubjectivity was conducted by O’Toole and Dubin (1968). Like Stryker (1956) 
they were motivated, in part, by the work of Mead (1934). However, while Stryker 
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read Mead through a cognitive lens (i.e., assuming that actors were cognitively aware 
of their intersubjective relations and thus could self-report on them), O’Toole and 
Dubin read Mead through a behaviourist lens.  Unsurprisingly, they arrived at a 
different methodological approach to the same question of whether perspective-taking 
actually occurs. 
O’Toole and Dubin (1968) unobtrusively measured the body sway of 
participants observing an actor lean in various directions, and found that observers 
mimic the bodily sway of actors: participants lean very slightly in the same relative 
orientation as the leaning actor. They also found that when feeding a baby, people will 
often open their own mouths as they wish the baby to do. Their systematic 
observations show that people, non-consciously, and at an embodied level, align 
themselves with the bodily orientation of others. What is interesting in this research is 
the methodology used. The observation of behaviour can, it seems, make visible 
forms of intersubjective relation that would remain opaque to self-report 
methodologies. 
Observational methodologies have developed beyond the basic machinery 
which O’Toole and Dubin used to measure body sway. Now computers allow for 
much finer-grained analysis of motor mimicry (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, MacInnis 
and Mullett, 1986). High resolution video recording, the ability to slow down videos, 
and split screens enable the simultaneous and detailed observation of the target and 
model. Methods have been developed to establish baselines and avoid artifacts. Using 
these methodologies, the phenomenon of motor mimicry has proved to be widespread, 
being evident in smiling, leaning, dodging, wincing, and baby feeding among many 
other behaviours. Much of this research has been brought together by Hatfield, 
Cacioppo and Rapson (1994) in their presentation and analysis of emotional 
Dialogical Analysis of Intersubjectivity   15 
contagion.  
A second strand to the methodology of observing behaviour are the 
experiments used by primatologists and developmental psychologists to assess 
intersubjectivity in non-human primates and children. For example, Tomasello, Call 
and Hare (2003) have used experiments to examine the extent to which non human 
animals are able to understand the mind of others. In their research a target behaviour 
is modelled and then observation is used to determine whether imitation occurs. The 
problem with such research, as already mentioned, is that the observation of 
behaviour can only reveal very basic forms of intersubjectivity, such as imitation. 
More complex intersubjective relations have been explored by developmental 
psychologists. Tasks such as the unexpected transfer belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983) have been used to test whether children can disentangle their own beliefs from 
their beliefs about another person’s false beliefs. Such tasks enable researchers to go 
beyond basic forms of intersubjectivity by including what is said by children into the 
analysis, and as such, the method goes beyond the observation of behaviour narrowly 
defined. 
Finally, recent interest in mirror neurons brings a new aspect to observational 
methods for studying intersubjectivity. The study of mirror neurons began with 
studies of the electrical activity of single neurons in monkeys. Researchers found that 
these neurons would become excited both when their owner performed an action and 
when their owner observed another monkey performing the same action (Gallese, 
Keysers and Rizzolatti, 2004). Mirror neurons have been found in monkeys for 
actions such as opening a nut, tearing paper, certain gestures and movements and 
eating-related behaviours. While in monkeys the range of actions covered by mirror 
neurons is relatively narrow, in humans the range of actions is much more extensive 
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(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Given the nature of mirror neurons and the extent to 
which they occur in humans there has been much enthusiastic speculation about their 
significance for language, theory of mind, empathy, imitation, perspective-taking, 
understanding, self-consciousness and agency (Hurley & Chater, 2005). From a 
methodological point of view, the study of mirror neurons is based upon the 
observation of individual behaviour and the behaviour of single neurons. The 
methodology is to compare the behaviours being observed and performed with the 
activity of neurons, without relying upon self-report. 
Across the studies which observe behaviour, including the behaviour of 
neurons, the dominant research interest is in demonstrating the extent to which an 
observer sympathetically, and usually non-consciously, either behaviourally mimics 
or neurologically ‘resonates’ with actions observed. The research has convincingly 
demonstrated that embodied intersubjectivity exists. Moreover, this form of 
intersubjectivity would not be visible using self-report methodology. It is unlikely that 
the participants in O’Toole and Dubin’s (1968) body sway experiment were aware of 
their own sympathetic body sway. Equally, it does not make much sense to ask 
whether people can self-report on the activity of individual mirror neurons. Thus we 
discover another limitation of the self-report methods: There are embodied aspects of 
intersubjectivity that are invisible to self-report. 
However, observing behaviour has its own limitations. Firstly, it is limited to 
studying intersubjectivity in terms of similarity. The intersubjectivity observed takes 
the form of similar behaviours observed and similar neuronal firing. But, people can 
orient to each other’s perspectives without adopting the same behavioural stance. The 
dynamics of recognition, or co-ordination across a division of labour require 
perspective-taking without people mimicking each other. Although there may be 
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some motor mimicry and neurological resonance in such complex co-ordinations, 
such an account is insufficient. Secondly, the more complex forms of intersubjectivity 
hitherto discussed in terms of metaperspectives and meta-metaperspectives seem to be 
largely invisible if one only observes behaviour. At best one can observe the flush 
produced by social attention. One could search for the behavioural correlates of social 
emotions such as embarrassment, pride and shame, but the search could not be taken 
far. While social emotions, such as embarrassment, might be observed, the reasons 
behind the emotion are much more difficult to observe. Thus while observing 
behaviour has the benefit of not relying upon self-report, it is unsuited to studying 
either the complex forms of intersubjectivity enabled by society or the thoughts that 
people have in relation to the thoughts of others. 
Analysing Talk 
The third methodological approach, analysing talk, again constitutes a new 
aspect of intersubjectivity. Assuming that intersubjective relations are produced and 
reproduced in social interaction, then observing what happens in social interaction, 
and particularly what is said in interaction, brings us close to the actual processes 
through which intersubjectivity is reproduced.  
Garfinkel’s (1984) ethnomethodology has been central in turning the attention 
of researchers towards the relation between talk and intersubjectivity. For Garfinkel 
intersubjectivity concerned the shared, but often implicit, taken-for-granted 
assumptions that enabled human communicative interaction. He suggested that the 
tightly woven intersubjective fabric of assumptions tends only to become visible 
when breached. This basic assumption is the opposite of the comparative self-report 
methodologies which assume that these assumptions are available to self-report. To 
make these intersubjective assumptions visible, and thus researchable, Garfinkel 
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encouraged his students to break the common assumptions of social interaction and 
record what happened. For instance, he directed his students to interact with their 
families as if they were strangers and their home was a hotel. In another study his 
students kept asking their interlocutors to be more specific about what they were 
saying. In each case, breaking the taken for granted assumptions profoundly disrupted 
the social interaction, triggering annoyance on the part of interlocutors and leading 
them to question the student’s motives and/or sanity. These disruptions reveal that in 
everyday interaction there are numerous implicit assumptions being made about the 
social situation. Interlocutors not only make these assumptions implicitly, but they 
implicitly assume that they are shared.  
Garfinkel’s insight that intersubjectivity can become visible during a breach 
has been carried forward by experimental research which has sought to engineer 
ruptures. Experimental situations are created in which there is a joint task with distinct 
social positions thus creating two different perspectives. For example, each participant 
is given unfamiliar tangrams and, without seeing each other’s, one participant must 
communicate to the other their sequence of shapes (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Or 
each participant is given a map, and a Director must verbally guide the Follower 
through the map (Blakar, 1973). Or, one participant is given a picture and they must 
verbally communicate that picture to the second participant who then has to draw the 
picture (Collins & Marková, 1999). In each of these experimental scenarios, the 
researchers create a divergence of perspective, and then observe how the participants 
repair it and create mutual understanding. These experiments have revealed the 
intensely collaborative nature of communication. Even when participants start out 
with massive divergences of perspective they work collaboratively to build a shared 
nomenclature and set of implicit assumptions which enable them to jointly navigate 
Dialogical Analysis of Intersubjectivity   19 
the task. The advantage with the experimental paradigm is that divergences of 
perspective can be created, ruptures can be engineered, and the characteristics of the 
participants can be manipulated.  
The analysis of the processes through which intersubjectivity is produced in 
talk has been advanced by the methodological procedures of conversation analysis. 
Although conversation analysis is a broad methodology, the tendency has been to 
focus upon naturally occurring talk-in-interaction rather than experimental data. The 
core focus has been on issues such as how conversations open and close, how topics 
are introduced, how topics are framed, how responsibility is assigned, how authority 
is claimed, how turn taking occurs and how interlocutors are positioned. From the 
standpoint of intersubjectivity, the research which interests us concerns interlocutors’ 
ongoing efforts to maintain mutual understanding. 
Even a casual exchange can entail the intersubjective tasks of agreeing on a 
topic, clarifying roles, establishing shared terminology, correcting misunderstandings, 
and agreeing that the conversation is over. For example, the frequent brief 
paralinguistic communications such as ‘uh-huh’ or head-nodding that punctuate a 
conversation are not designed to take over the turn or to contribute additional 
meaning, but to provide ongoing feedback about comprehension (Schegloff, 1982). 
That is, they inform the speaker about their effective construction of intersubjective 
understanding. A similar role is played by the ‘third position repair’ described by 
Schegloff (1992). A listener will often respond to a speaker with an utterance which, 
instead of contributing anything new, simply displays understanding of what has been 
said. This gives the first speaker an opportunity to correct a misunderstanding, or 
consolidate an understanding, thus establishing intersubjective agreement. In this way, 
conversation analysts have convincingly shown that intersubjectivity is not something 
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abstract, remote or impossible to achieve, rather intersubjectivity is routine and even 
mundane. “Intersubjectivity” is, as Shegloff (1992, p. 1299) writes “woven into the 
very warp and weft of ordinary conversation.” 
Conversation analysis makes an important contribution to the study of 
intersubjectivity because it focuses upon the processes through which intersubjectivity 
is negotiated moment-by-moment within specific interactions. Conversation analysis 
treats intersubjectivity as a genuinely relational phenomenon. Research based on 
observing discourse is not concerned with ‘testing’ whether perspective taking occurs, 
nor is it concerned with diagnosing divergences of perspective, it assumes that partial 
intersubjectivity exists, and focuses upon the processes through which it is created, 
recreated, disrupted and repaired within social interaction.  
The main limitation of conversation analysis is that it tends to focus upon the 
discourse observed and is reluctant to go beyond specific interactions. It looks only 
within the text for its explanations, and avoids reference to phenomena beyond the 
text, such as societal discourses, interpretative repertoires, cultures or social 
institutions (Wetherell, 1998). But talk is situated in institutional and cultural 
contexts. Material situations and social roles provide the resources out of which 
people construct mutual understandings. Within psychology, some conversation 
analysts tend to be willing to treat psychological phenomena only in terms of how 
they are spoken about by participants, and arguments that ‘intra-psychological’ events 
outside the conversation are not amenable to analysis (Potter & Edwards, 1999; 
Marková, 2000). Thus, addressing subjectivity – even its intersubjective nature – is 
not promoted by the conversation analytic approach.  
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Ethnographic Engagement 
The separation of methods into self-report, observations and the analysis of talk, as 
we have done above, is, when considered from the point of view of actual research, 
somewhat artificial. Intersubjectivity is situated in everyday life contexts, and 
everyday life does not conform to such a separation. Lived life has reflective aspects 
(amenable to self-report), entails actions and practices (amenable to observation), and 
usually lots of talk (amenable to conversation analysis). Moreover, lived life is 
embedded in social, institutional, historical and cultural contexts which are central to 
any interpretation (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Schutz, 1973). To consider just one 
methodological approach, and to do so without regard for the broader context, yields a 
limited perspective on the phenomenon, and limits the possibility of apprehending the 
variety of means (embodied practice, verbal exchanges, reliance on cultural 
assumptions, etc) through which intersubjectivity is negotiated.  
Unsurprisingly, much of the most subtle research on intersubjectivity entails a 
combination of the methods described above.  Such research, often going by the name 
of ethnography, ethnomethodology or participant observation, tends to combine the 
observation of practices and interactions with an analysis of talk. Moreover, it 
incorporates both a detailed historical and contextual understanding of the given 
interaction and a reflective participatory engagement with the research phenomena. 
This holistic approach to studying intersubjectivity has been articulated by Prus 
(1996). Starting out from the assumption that everyday life is a meaningful 
intersubjective creation, Prus argues that ethnography is the most suitable method for 
studying intersubjectivity: to enter into the everyday life of people, to participate in 
their lives, to talk and observe and to interpret people within their lived context. 
According to this approach, research is a process in which the researcher moves 
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between learning about local meanings, participating in local activities, and reflecting 
upon those experiences. Thus there is an oscillation between participating and 
observing (Ricoeur, 1973). 
The historical threads of this approach come out of the Chicago School of 
participant observation and anthropological studies of encountering other people and 
cultures. But the basic approach has been widely developed in many empirical 
domains, from the study of tourist-local interactions (Gillespie, 2006a) to studies of 
distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995). The ethnographic approach enables a rich 
analysis of the different perspectives in the field and how they interact. For instance, 
Mosse (2005), in an ethnography of the aid system linking donors to communities in 
India, highlights the multifaceted role of ‘development brokers’ including consultants 
and managers, who work at the boundary between the world of aid policy and the 
world of project implementation. In an impressive intersubjective undertaking, these 
development brokers are shown to negotiate between the almost incommensurable 
perspectives of messy concrete project reality, and changing, ambiguous, but directive 
policy statements. In this context, ethnography allowed a rich understanding of the 
unrecognised and unofficial intersubjective dynamics of communication and 
coordination within the aid system, by studying the everyday practices of 
implementing and accounting for a project, by tapping into the multiple perspectives 
(donors, development workers, and communities) at work, and by the author himself 
moving between the engaged role of a consultant and the distant role of an academic.  
Starting with the phenomenon, the ethnographic approach makes use of 
whatever forms of data aid the interpretative process – such as historical documents, 
interviews, naturally-occurring talk, observations, participatory experiences, 
drawings, among others. The ethnographic approach also recognised that the 
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researcher is part of the ethnographic encounter (Clifford, ethnographic authority). 
Thus, the researcher does not study intersubjectivity ‘out there’ but rather enters into 
the intersubjective web, and through being part of that intersubjective world, comes to 
understand it.  
There are two major strengths of the ethnographic approach, firstly, that its 
sources of data are naturally-occurring, and secondly, that it combines different forms 
of data. If intersubjectivity is often implicit, and if it is embedded in and made 
possible by everyday situated language and practices, then to apprehend the full 
richness and complexity of intersubjectivity, ethnography is an ideal approach.  
Dialogism 
Having reviewed the major methodological approaches to the study of 
intersubjectivity, we now turn to articulating theoretical and methodological tools that 
we suggest are particularly useful, and that overcome some of the weaknesses 
identified in the reviewed methods. The theoretical tradition of dialogism, we argue, 
provides useful concepts for the analysis of intersubjectivity (covered in this section) 
and can work together with insights from other methodologies (reviewed in the 
previous sections) in a multi-faceted empirical approach to the study of 
intersubjectivity (covered in the next section). Like ethnography, dialogism 
emphasises historically and culturally located meaning and cross-cutting 
methodologies which combine analysing talk with observing interactions. However, 
dialogism offers a specific theoretical apparatus for analysing intersubjectivity, which 
is more than simply an ethnographic approach.  
Dialogism stems from the theoretical work of Hegel, Mead and Bakhtin 
amongst others. The basic idea is that knowledge, society and subjectivity are all 
dynamic and contextual phenomena which can be theorised in terms of dialogues 
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between different (real and imagined) perspectives (Marková, 2003b; Linell, 2009). 
Knowledge must be considered in terms of competing knowledges which are 
sustained in various institutional and power relations (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Society is 
conceptualised in terms of differentiated groups and social relations in various states 
of tension (Moscovici, 1976). Subjectivity entails shifting I-positions, uncertainty, 
ambiguity, internal dialogues and dialogical tensions (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). 
Knowledge, society and subjectivity are produced through dialogue and are dialogical 
in their structure and dynamics. There are several key assumptions in dialogism 
(Linell, 2009). It is not our aim to review them all. Instead we highlight three ideas 
which are of particular significance for a dialogical approach to intersubjectivity: 
situation-transcending phenomena, addressivity, and voices. 
First, in contrast with narrow variants of conversation analysis, dialogism goes 
beyond immediate utterances to consider situation-transcending phenomena (Linell, 
2009). While the goings-on within a dialogue are indeed important, understanding 
dialogue entails understanding the social, historical and cultural context (Marková, 
2003b) as well as personal, subjective and intra-psychological processes (Linell, 
2009). Dialogue is possible because of a partially shared fabric of assumptions which 
need to be understood historically. Accordingly, genealogical analysis is a useful 
means of unpacking the historical context (Gillespie, 2006b) and ethnographic 
research is a useful means of understanding the social and cultural context (Cornish, 
2004). Indeed experimental research, which has created ruptures, has found that 
shared representations are an important means of arguing (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006) 
and re-creating a shared definition of the situation (Collins & Marková, 1999). In 
addition, the outcomes of dialogue can lead to lasting changes in meaning at both the 
societal level and the individual level. Thus, in contrast to conversation analysis, 
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dialogism is quite compatible with the theory of social representations (Howarth, 
2006) and the notion of internal or subjective dialogues (Marková, 2003b), both of 
which can be transformed through dialogue. Thus dialogism conceptualises 
intersubjectivity as entwined with situation-transcending phenomena such as culture, 
institutions and subjective processes.  
Second, in contrast to the dominant assumption that the individual is the basic 
unit of analysis, dialogism takes the communicative relation as the basic unit of 
analysis. According to both Bakhtin (1986) and Mead (1922), the boundary of an 
utterance is not drawn around the acoustic blast, rather it must include the audience in 
two senses. In the first sense it is the future response of the audience which finalises 
the meaning of the utterance and thus defines the boundary of the utterance. In the 
second sense because communication entails an orientation to the future response of 
the audience the anticipated future response is already in the utterance (before the 
audience has a chance to respond). Thus every utterance or communicative gesture 
can only be understood in terms of the expected audience to which it orients and the 
actual audience that it finds.  
The way in which utterances orient to, and position, the audience is termed 
addressivity.  Consider the utterance ‘You had a fairly lengthy conversation with him, 
didn’t you, on that evening of February fourteenth?’ Who is speaking? And who is 
being spoken to? How is the speaker positioning the addressee? People usually 
suspect, correctly, that the speaker is a lawyer, and that the addressee is a woman. 
And people are usually unsurprised to find that the utterance comes from a rape trial. 
Yet there is nothing in the utterance about a woman, about law, or about rape. Where 
does this understanding of the utterance come from? The answer is addressivity. Who 
else, other than teachers and inquisitors, ask people questions when they already 
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believe they know the answer? Who else is so concerned about dates, places, and 
specific events? And if the speaker is a lawyer, then what might the legal issue be? 
What might follow from a conversation with ‘him’? And why does the lawyer 
emphasise that it was a ‘lengthy’ conversation? The addressivity within the lawyer’s 
utterances enables us to ‘reverse engineer’ the utterance and to speculate about the 
implied audience and context. Addressivity is a powerful analytic concept for 
studying intersubjectivity, as it reveals the implicit orientations of speakers to the 
orientation of their audience. 
The third useful concept from dialogism is that of voices. Utterances do not 
only reflect their audience, but they reflect their historical and social context. Each 
utterance is a product of the semiotic and social environment that precedes it. People 
do not speak their own language. They speak a second-hand language with second-
hand words, and usually they are propagating second-hand ideas. “The utterance,” 
Bakhtin (1986, p. 93) writes, “like Leibniz’s monad, reflects the speech processes, 
others’ utterances, and, above all, preceding links in the chain.” Utterances, when 
closely analysed, reveal their own history. Conversational turns which used to be 
between people reappear as shifts of perspective within a single utterance. Utterances 
originating in diverse contexts and spoken by diverse people are born again side-by-
side in the same utterance. Old words, phrases, and communicative genres are re-
formed, re-contextualised and re-produced. Although each so-called new utterance is 
filled with new intent it never completely escapes its previous usage which is the 
wellspring of its meaning. 
The social and historical context of an utterance is most clearly evident in the 
multiple voices that often populate an utterance. Bakhtin claimed, somewhat 
flippantly, that about one-third of all conversational dialogue is either direct or 
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indirect quotation of other people’s words. While this may be an exaggeration, close 
attention to conversations reveals that people do spend a lot of time talking about 
what other people have said or might say (Gillespie, 2006a). The voice of others can 
appear in different ways in a text. In direct quotation the ‘voice’ of the other is 
animated and quoted directly (e.g. “Bob said ‘doctors are tyrannical’”). Direct 
quotation is often accompanied by a change in accent and a change in pronoun frame 
of reference. Indirect quotation, or ‘characterising’ occurs when the speaker presents a 
version of the other person’s point of view (e.g. “Bob feels that the doctors dominate 
the hospital”). The idea of voices is useful for the study of intersubjectivity because it 
reveals the presence of multiple perspectives within a single utterance or brief 
exchange.  
Dialogism, because of its fundamentally relational stance, is ideally suited to 
the study of intersubjectivity (Marková, 2003a). To date dialogical concepts have 
profitably been used to study intersubjectivity within many contexts, including, 
situated dialogue (Linell, 1998), diaries (Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling & Zittoun, 
2007), historical commemoration (Olick, 1999), collective action (Cornish & Ghosh, 
2007) and inter-cultural relations (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Dialogism is based on a 
distinctive epistemology, and provides useful and subtle concepts for the analysis of 
talk and action in terms of the relation between different perspectives. Dialogism can 
be characterised as a collection of theoretical concepts which provide analytic 
purchase, and which researchers apply in different ways. Our aim, in the next section, 
is to advance the dialogical method of studying intersubjectivity by combining it with 
insights drawn from our preceding review of methods.  
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Towards a Dialogical Analysis 
We propose to combine Laing, Phillipson and Lee’s (1966) framework for studying 
intersubjectivity with the dialogical concepts of context, addressivity and voice. 
Laing, Phillipson and Lee developed a very useful conceptual framework for 
analysing the complex and recursive nature of intersubjective relations, but self-report 
questionnaires are not a suitable methodology for analysing meta-metaperspectives. 
Thus we propose to use their conceptual framework, but not their method. We 
advocate analysis of dialogue as found in experiments, interviews, group discussions 
or naturally-occurring contexts. Using the analytic concepts of voice and addressivity 
enables us to get at both explicit and implicit perspectives, thus transcending the 
opposition between the self-report and observational methodologies. Table 4 presents 
the coding frame for such a dialogical analysis.  
Imagine a situation in a company where the workers are planning to go on 
strike because they are dissatisfied with the working conditions. One of the workers, 
Sally, says to her boss ‘I love my work.’ She is overheard, and is quoted by a second 
employee: “she said ‘I love my work.’” But Sally herself overhears this and says to 
her colleagues ‘he keeps telling people that I said I love my work.’ Let us interpret 
this example in terms of our coding frame. 
Beginning with the direct perspectives, Sally’s explicit direct perspective is 
simply that she enjoys her work. This direct perspective could also be observed as an 
implicit perspective, if we were to see Sally working late, or volunteering for tasks, or 
speaking about her work with enthusiasm. On the other hand, her statement may be 
interpreted in terms of context and addressivity to reveal an alternative direct 
perspective. In saying ‘I love my work,’ Sally may be implying that she is not 
committed to the strike, or that other employees less loyal to the company do not 
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enjoy their work, or, indeed, she may be prefacing complaints about her working 
conditions with the statement that she loves her work, implying that she is an 
enthusiastic worker, and thus she cannot be dismissed as a work-shy complainer.    
When Sally’s colleague reports that she said ‘I love my work,’ we are dealing 
with a metaperspective. Sally’s voice reappears in her colleague’s utterance, revealing 
his perspective on her perspective on her work, and if we did not know about the 
potential strike, we might decide that this is simply a statement about Sally’s work 
satisfaction. But in the context of the potential strike, the reported statement suggests 
an implicit metaperspective, that Sally may not be committed to the strike and is a 
danger to their solidarity. By comparing Sally’s direct perspective with the 
colleagues’ metaperspective, we can establish whether there is understanding or 
misunderstanding. If Sally went on, in her conversation with her boss, to list her 
complaints about her working conditions, unheard by her colleague, there may be a 
misunderstanding here. But if Sally was indeed trying to ingratiate herself with the 
boss, and the colleagues think that Sally is unlikely to join the strike, then they can be 
said to understand her perspective without agreeing with her. 
Finally, at the third level, when Sally says ‘he keeps saying that I said that I 
love my work,’ she is voicing a meta-metaperspective on her colleague’s 
metaperspective on her perspective on her work. If Sally’s direct perspective is that 
she does not love her work, then she is giving voice to a perceived misunderstanding. 
However, turning to the implicit level might be revealing. Considering the context and 
addressivity, her statement may suggest a meta-metaperspective that her colleagues 
would disapprove of the news that Sally likes her work, and so she is trying to correct 
a misunderstanding and explain that actually she does not like her work, and is 
planning to join the strike. Or, she may be implying that her colleague is spreading 
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unfair rumours about her, and seeking to influence her colleagues’ perspectives on the 
rumour-mongering colleague. When a person directly voices a meta-metaperspective 
(‘he thinks that I think that…’), they are often trying to correct a misunderstanding 
(‘he is wrong, and I don’t actually think that…’).    
Several comments about this example need to be made. The analysis makes 
use of background information, about the strike, and about work culture. The data for 
the analysis need not be overt speech, rather, any communicative act, such as staying 
late at work, can be part of the analysis. The use of dialogical concepts enables the 
analysis to go beyond the obvious, revealing implicit orientations.  
The proposed framework enables a dialogical analysis of intersubjectivity as it 
manifests both within and between people or groups. Using the framework, for 
example, to study data from one person means that the perceived intersubjective 
relations detailed in Table 3 can be analysed. Perceived misunderstandings and 
feelings of being misunderstood, and the resultant internal dialogical tensions can be 
clearly articulated. Using the framework to study both parties mean that the actual 
intersubjective relations detailed in Table 2 can be analysed. Comparing what one 
person or group thinks with what the other individual or group thinks they think can 
reveal actual misunderstandings and thus unpack interpersonal and intergroup 
tensions. 
From a methodological point of view, identifying the explicit meanings is 
relatively straightforward and empirical. Such analysis remains at the level of 
description. However, the interpretative process for identifying implicit meanings is 
complex. Often the same utterance can be interpreted in both explicit and implicit, or 
descriptive and interpretative, ways. If someone says to their partner, when viewing 
an apartment for sale, ‘this one is so spacious,’ that communicates a direct perspective 
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about the apartment, but it also implies an implicit direct perspective that the previous 
apartment they viewed was not as spacious. If a doctor tells a mother that ‘it is really 
important for children to eat 5 portions of fruit and vegetables everyday’ this 
explicitly communicates the doctor’s knowledge. However, it can also be interpreted 
as implying a metaperspective: the doctor thinks that the mother does not know or 
implement this knowledge.  
The analysis of explicit and implicit perspectives, or meanings, entails 
complementary strengths and weaknesses. The strength of analysing explicit 
meanings is that there is little ambiguity in what is actually being said. The task is 
descriptive not interpretative. This strength is revealed in contrast to the weakness of 
coding implicit meanings. The range of possible implied meanings can be very broad, 
and sometimes even contradictory implications are possible. Given only one utterance 
it is impossible to establish the validity of an interpretation. Confident interpretation 
depends upon assumptions, significant others, norms, frames of reference, situations 
and history that are all beyond any single utterance. It follows that analysis of implicit 
meanings requires a substantial knowledge of the wider context. Hence, ethnographic 
fieldwork has an important role to play in dialogical analyses by providing a rich 
social and cultural interpretive frame. Ethnographic work also enables the use of 
observation of nonverbal as well as verbal action, which can be revealing about 
implicit perspectives. 
The tentativeness with which we should approach the identification of implicit 
perspectives does not mean that coding implicit meanings is inferior to coding explicit 
meanings. What people can explicitly say is limited by their self-insight, and, as 
argued in relation to self-report methodology, people rarely able to articulate the full 
web of intersubjective relations that they are embedded within. Thus analysing 
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implicit perspectives transcends the limitation of the self-report methodologies by 
incorporating something of the observational approaches. 
When considering real-world inter-group and inter-individual relations it also 
becomes evident that there is more than self and other to consider. Talk often pertains 
to other parties outside the direct relation. For example, in studying the relation 
between a company and the ecological movement they support, one might find that 
the company sponsors the movement in order to create a positive impression of the 
company to the public at large. In such a case the intersubjective relation expands 
beyond the immediate self-other (i.e., company-movement) relation to include a third 
perspective (that of the public). That is to be expected, and the analysis can include 
this by proceeding upon the same lines of distinguishing direct, meta, and meta-meta 
perspectives. The important thing is to be very clear in the analysis about who is 
taking whose perspective. 
Finally, in our experience it is often difficult to distinguish between direct, 
meta and meta-meta perspectives because there is much perspective-taking built into 
ordinary language. Some individual words (e.g. loyal, guilty, ashamed) already 
‘chunk’ more than one perspective. Consider the difference between the utterance 
‘you are making me feel guilty’ and ‘I think that you think that I have done something 
that I should not have done.’ Both of these utterances entail explicit meta-
metaperspectives. However, the latter is much more difficult to comprehend than the 
former. This is because the term ‘guilt’ has packed within it a complex set of 
perspectives. The problem arises when we consider an utterance like ‘he feels guilty.’ 
Is it a metaperspective concerning the thoughts of the other? Or, is it a complex meta-
metaperspective? In our experience this problem needs to be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis, with each utterance analysed in terms of its own context in order to make 
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an appropriate decision about the level at which it operates. 
These comments regarding the complexity of coding implicit perspectives 
reveal that any such analysis is fundamentally interpretative. There is no guaranteed 
means of knowing exactly what is implied by an action or utterance. Interpretation 
must be based upon a contextual understanding of the act and exploring alternative 
interpretations (Holloway & Jefferson, 2001). Thus the interpretative process, or 
analysis, must itself be dialogical. Using publicly available materials or discussing the 
empirical material with colleagues is a good means of stimulating self-reflective and 
diverse interpretations (Cornish, Zittoun & Gillespie, 2007). Good interpretation, as 
has been pointed out before, entails dialoguing with alternative interpretations (Bauer 
& Gaskell, 2000). 
Conclusion 
Our purpose, in this article, has been to facilitate empirical research on 
intersubjectivity. To that end we have reviewed methodological approaches and 
contributed a framework for a dialogical analysis. The dialogical approach that we are 
contributing to is not meant to eclipse other approaches, rather it is meant to be one 
more method in our toolbox. Each of the methods reviewed is useful in relation to a 
different sort of question and conceptualisation of intersubjectivity. Comparative self-
report methodologies are extremely useful for the quick diagnosis of the location and 
extent of divergences and convergences of perspective. However, the self-report 
methodologies require reflective insight on the part of participants which is not 
always evident. The observation of behaviour gives access to some of the non-
reportable forms of intersubjectivity, especially basic forms of intersubjectivity such 
as muscle and neuronal mimicry, but not to the more reflective and complex forms of 
intersubjectivity. Conversation analysis can provide useful insights into how 
Dialogical Analysis of Intersubjectivity   34 
misunderstandings arise and are resolved in ongoing talk. Conversation analysis, 
however, is less useful for dealing with the socio-historical basis of intersubjectivity 
or with the intersubjective nature of subjectivity. We have argued that dialogism 
provides a promising set of analytic tools to analyse recursive perspective-taking and 
to make claims that go beyond the immediate interactional setting of the data. We 
have proposed that a dialogical analysis can profitably use the theoretical framework 
proposed by Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966) without using their self-report 
methodology.  
The value of any new methodological approach is not found in theoretical or 
historical arguments, but in the avenues for fruitful research opened up (Cornish & 
Gillespie, 2009). Accordingly, in conclusion we detail some new lines of research that 
the proposed method of dialogical analysis opens up for the study of intra-
psychological and inter-psychological relations. 
Contemporary societies are characterised by a great diversity of perspectives 
interacting. The structural differentiation of society sustains a diversity of social 
positions within society, each with a distinctive perspective. Globalisation brings 
people from a wide range of cultural, religious, and geographic backgrounds into 
close interaction. Vast divergences of perspective exist between many groups – for 
example between the health services and service users (Assa-Ely & Kimberlin, 2005), 
between departments within the same organisation (Boland & Tenkasi, 1999), 
between different sectors in society (Scheff, 1967), and between professionals and 
their clients (Silverman, 1987). The proposed method of dialogical analysis makes 
these divergences of perspective tractable to research. Interviews, group discussions, 
documents and mass media can be analysed to identify the explicit and implicit direct, 
meta, and meta-meta perspectives for all the individuals or groups in a given relation 
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or joint activity. Then comparing the inter-relations between these would yield the 
points of convergence and divergence, understanding and misunderstanding, 
perceived understandings or misunderstandings, and so on. Beyond simply diagnosing 
the misunderstandings that are prevalent in contemporary societies, interesting 
questions include: What social and interactional dynamics create understanding or 
misunderstanding? What social technologies and forms of social interaction can be 
used in order to create more understanding of the divergent perspectives which exist? 
For example, how do manipulations of the ideals of the public sphere, as described by 
Habermas (1984), lead to different patterns of intersubjective relation? The method 
could also be used to examine the impact of interventions aimed at fostering dialogue 
with before and after analysis revealing changes in intersubjective relations. 
The proposed framework could also be used to analyse the intra-psychological 
relations, or subjectivity, of a single individual. Diaries, interview data, personal 
narratives, letters and talk-aloud protocol data can all be coded using the framework 
to identify the individual’s explicit and implicit direct, meta and meta-meta 
perspectives. One could then identify dialogical tensions between either explicit and 
implicit elements, or between the various perspectives. It seems particularly 
interesting to examine how the perspectives of others (i.e., meta and meta-meta 
perspectives) are treated within the subjectivity of the given individual. Are the meta 
and meta-meta perspectives treated as foreign objects? Are they treated as unreal? Are 
they stereotyped? And are they framed in a dismissive way (Blakar, 1979) or are they 
isolated by semantic barriers that inhibit transformative dialogue (Gillespie, 2008)? 
Or, conversely, do they engage in transformative dialogue with the direct perspectives 
of the individual concerned? Even individuals strongly committed to one perspective 
are aware of alternatives, and the question is, how do these different perspectives 
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interact within the individual? It is likely that empirical research will reveal a diverse 
set of possible semiotic relations between perspectives within the one individual 
(Valsiner, 2002). 
Another intra-psychological line of research concerns the dialogical self 
(Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007) which conceives of an individual’s subjectivity as 
comprising a landscape of ‘I-positions’ from which the individual speaks (Gillespie, 
2006c). But there is considerable confusion about the nature of those I-positions and 
how to identify them. The dialogical framework presented here is a means of 
identifying explicit and implicit I-positions at the three different levels. Thus the 
framework could be used to examine the dialogical tensions between different voices, 
or I-positions, within the individual’s subjectivity (e.g., Aveling & Gillespie, 2008). 
The theory of the dialogical self has also been criticised for failing to connect the 
dialogical self with the social context (O’Sullivan-Lago & de Abreu, in press). The 
proposed framework could also be used to situate the dialogical self within a set of 
social relations, by examining both the intra-psychological and inter-psychological 
relations simultaneously, and then examining their relation.  
The two lines of research outlined above, concerning inter-psychological and 
intra-psychological relations, reveal that the proposed method of dialogical analysis 
entails a re-conceptualisation of the individual-society antinomy. The rigid opposition 
between individuals on the one hand and society on the other has been unhelpful for 
understanding social behaviour (Moscovici, 1972). The dialogical approach to 
intersubjectivity entails a return to Mead (1934, p. 201) and Schutz’s (1973, p. 178) 
conceptualisations of the individuals in relation to others as akin to Leibnitz’s monad 
in relation to the universe. In Mead’s words: 
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The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms of the social process, and 
are individual reflections of it […] is not in the least incompatible with, or 
destructive of, the fact that every individual self has its own peculiar 
individuality, its own unique pattern; because each individual self within that 
process, while it reflects in its organized structure the behavior pattern of that 
process as a whole, does so from its own particular and unique standpoint 
within that process, and thus reflects in its organized structure a different 
aspect or perspective of this whole social behavior pattern from that which is 
reflected in the organized structure of any other individual self within that 
process (just as every monad in the Leibnizian universe mirrors that universe 
from a different point of view, and thus mirrors a different aspect or 
perspective of that universe). (Mead, 1934, p. 201) 
Within a dialogical analysis individuals empirically manifest as being permeated by 
social discourses and significant others. By analysing the explicit and implicit meta 
and meta-meta perspectives within a given individual, the individual is seen as an 
intersubjective being woven out of social relations and discourses. Groups and 
institutions are also re-conceptualised. Groups need not be homogenous, they can be 
based on difference, but only if combined with a degree of mutual understanding of 
that difference.  That is to say, what makes a group or society is not similarity but the 
degree to which the members’ perspectives are understood by one another. 
Accordingly, the proposed method of dialogical analysis enables us to study the 
individual within the group (as a self-reflective position within a web of social 
perspectives) and the group within the individual (as the range of social perspectives 
refracted through the individual’s subjectivity). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Three levels of intersubjectivity between Self and Other in relation to X 
Level Self (Person/group) 
 
Other (Person/group) 
Direct perspectives Self’s perspective on X  
(SX) 
 
Other’s perspective on X  
(OX) 
Metaperspectives Self’s perspective on Other’s 
perspective on X  
(SOX) 
 
Other’s perspective on Self’s 
perspective on X 
(OSX) 
Meta-
metaperspectives 
Self’s perspective on Other’s 
perspective on Self’s 
perspective on X  
(SOSX) 
 
Other’s perspective on Self’s 
perspective on Other’s 
perspective on X 
(OSOX) 
 
Table 2: Actual intersubjective relations 
 
Table 3: Perceived intersubjective relations 
Comparisons Intersubjective relation 
 
Direct perspective                       Direct perspective 
(SX)                           &                           (OX) 
 
Agreement/disagreement 
Direct perspective                          Metaperspective 
(SX)                          &                      (OSX) 
 
Understanding/ 
misunderstanding 
Meta-metaperspective                    Metaperspective 
(SOSX)             &                      (OSX) 
 
Realisation of understanding/ 
misunderstanding 
Comparisons Intra-subjective relation 
 
Direct perspective                          Metaperspective 
(SX)                        &                        (SOX) 
 
Perceived agreement/ 
disagreement 
Direct perspective                 Meta-metaperspective 
(SX)                        &                  (SOSX) 
 
Feeling understood/ 
misunderstood 
Metaperspective                    Meta-metaperspective 
(SOX)                 &                  (SOSX) 
 
Perceived understanding/ 
misunderstanding 
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Table 4: Coding frame for a dialogical analysis of intersubjectivity 
Level Explicit Implicit 
 
Direct 
perspectives 
(SX) 
 
Statement that explicitly 
communicates a direct 
perspective 
 
“I love my work” 
 
 
Statement that can be 
interpreted as revealing a 
direct perspective 
 
“I love my work” (i.e, I don’t 
see a need to go on strike) 
 
Metaperspectives 
(SOX) 
Quotation or characterisation 
that explicitly communicates a 
metaperspective 
 
“She said ‘I love my work’” 
 
Quotation or characterisation 
that can be interpreted as 
revealing a metaperspective 
 
“She said ‘I love my work’” 
(i.e., she is not committed to a 
strike)   
 
 
Meta-
metaperspectives 
(SOSX) 
Quotation or characterisation 
that explicitly communicates a 
meta-metaperspective 
 
“He keeps telling people that I 
said I love my work” 
 
Quotation or characterisation 
that can be interpreted as 
revealing a meta-
metaperspective  
 
“He keeps telling people that I 
said I love my work” (i.e., he 
is trying to make me appear 
disloyal) 
 
 
 
